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Introduction

Felson, Nancy, 1943-

Arethusa, Volume 37, Number 3, Fall 2004, pp. 253-266 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: [10.1353/are.2004.0021](https://doi.org/10.1353/are.2004.0021)



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INTRODUCTION

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Deixis <δείκνυμι: 1) bring to light, show forth; 2) show, point out

(LSJ)

The essential characteristic of deictic expressions is that their semantic values depend on the real-world context in which they are uttered. But this may not be so when the sentence in which the deictic appears is itself embedded in more complex utterances.

C. J. Fillmore 1997.61

The function of *here* is to indicate the “given” position on any dimension of localization that may be relevant at the moment . . . We are, actually, not necessarily located physically within the spaces we refer to as *here*.

Anna Fuchs 1993.18–19 (emphasis in original)

That’s what fiction is about, isn’t it, the selective transforming of reality? The twisting of it to bring out its essence? What need did I have to go to Portugal?

Yann Mantel, *Life of Pi*, p. viii

Deictics bridge the tangible world of reality and the abstract world of fantasy. As indexical signs that point to objects or referents with which they are (or pretend to be) contiguous, their sense is not determined by any inherent semantic property and cannot be ascertained by consulting a lexicon. Rather, to decipher their meaning and construe their reference, the

interpreter must, at the least, first calibrate the parameters of the context, optimally by being at the actual utterance as an eye- or ear-witness, or else by imagined presence.

The project of investigating the poetics of deixis begins with an exploration of linguistic forms that point in a variety of ways to diverse kinds of objects: extra-textually to realia in the surrounding or implied context (deixis *ad oculos*); backward (ana-) and forward (cata-) to objects within the text (anaphoric or textual deixis); and imaginatively to objects brought into existence by the very act of pretending to designate them (deixis *am Phantasma*: fictional deixis). In the act of pointing to or creating such objects, deixis establishes orientation points between which the characters of the textual universe move. The act of tracking the movement of such characters gives even distant readers a vivid sense of involvement and, indeed, of presence at the distant performance event.

Self-reflexive deixis points to the enunciation itself (see Calame 1995.3–8 and Benveniste 1974.79–88) and partakes of all the three main types identified by Bühler (1990.137–57). A poet may employ such phrases as “this poem here” or “what I am doing/saying now” or “how you in the audience are right now responding” to refer to the poetic product or the respective acts of making and receiving the poem. When one asks whether the referent “exists” as an object, the answer must be tentative: the very act of naming it and speaking it (i.e., performing it) brings it into existence. But such pointing treats the object as if it already exists and, in this sense, it contains an element of deixis *am Phantasma*, of pretending to point. It also partakes of ocular deixis insofar as the referent is becoming audible and visible for the audience just at the moment when the poet/performer points at it. Moreover, the pointing backward and forward within the text resembles (though it should be distinguished from) anaphoric deixis. Thus self-reflexive pointing is a hybrid of the other three.

Critics who focus on deixis *ad oculos* aim to recover the original context in which a specific genre of poetry was first performed. Those who focus on anaphora are mainly interested in the cohesion of the text. Finally, investigators of fictional deixis hope to illuminate the poetic effects produced by the practice of deixis both on poetic characters and on external auditors and readers.

All three deictic phenomena—ocular, textual, and fictional—have the pragmatic effect of making audiences work. All invite interpreters to draw inferences—fewer when the referent is proximate and visible, more when time and distance have effaced it, and still more when the referent, like

a unicorn, is fictional in the first place. Yet even for those attending a first performance of a poetic text, discrepancies would have elicited interpretation (and hence work), for example, in bridging their literal *hic et nunc* with whatever the poem presents as such.

Poetic deixis builds upon and is constrained by the linguistic properties of deixis. I begin, therefore, by introducing these properties, drawing my examples primarily from Greek, but with occasional reference to other Indo-European languages, especially Latin.¹ In “The Linguistics of Deixis,” I discuss person, space, and time deixis, and then turn to textual deixis—grammatical anaphora.² Finally, in “The Poetics of Deixis,” I pose a number of rhetorical questions about the poetic uses and poetic effects of deixis. In partial response, I first introduce the concept of deictic displacement and then present the seven contributions to this volume. In the third and final section, “The Critic as Tantalus?,” I assess from my own *hic et nunc* what burdens this new “technology of criticism” exacts and what it promises in return.

THE LINGUISTICS OF DEIXIS

Deixis—the “pointing out” and “pointing at” function of language—operates within the two dimensions that frame human cognition: time and space. If we imagine these dimensions as existing in a continuum representable in the form of a graph or grid, then the deictic operators of language provide the means of locating events, states, or objects within this grid. In the case of time, the operator is tense, along with aspect and various associated adverbials; in the case of space, pronouns and their associated adjectives and adverbials.³

1 For my material on Indo-European deictic forms and practices, especially in this section on “The Linguistics of Deixis,” I am greatly indebted to my colleague Jared Klein, whose contribution on “Deixis and Linguistics” was too long for inclusion in the present volume. I have borrowed freely from his explanations and examples.

2 The polysemy of this term lives on today and may be disambiguated by employing such qualifiers as grammatical vs. rhetorical (or iterative) anaphora. In classical rhetoric, dating back to the treatise *Peri Hermeneias* of one Demetrius (first century B.C.E.), the term anaphora refers to the repetition of a word, especially at the beginning of separate clauses. Our topic, however, is grammatical anaphora.

3 Deictic pronouns are categorically distinct from personal pronouns; in Indo-European languages, third-person pronouns are old deictics imported into the system of personal

At the core of these dimensional relationships lie the privative oppositions: here/not here and now/not now—relationships further complicated by the question of perspective. In particular, any system of reference is based on a point of origin: the *origo*, or zero point, or deictic center. In spoken language, this is normally the self, the *ego* functioning as speaker (the “first person”).⁴ Yet besides pointing self-reflexively, person deixis may also designate the addressee (the “second person”)⁵ or an absent party (the “third person”). This three-way system breaks down into two bipartite oppositions. The first of these—first vs. second person—opposes the two participants in a conversational speech-act: speaker and addressee (“I” vs. “you”); the second—first and second vs. third person—opposes these two collectively to a nonparticipant in the speech-act, who may be present or absent, near or far.⁶

Each deictic pronoun thus linked to person often receives *metaphorical* spatial interpretations.⁷ First-person deictics are proximal in that they refer to objects in the neighborhood of the speaker (“this by me”), while second-person deictics designating an addressee (“that by you”) tend to be less clearly localized. The reason is that, while my position is always fixed by definition as the zero point, you, the addressee, can be right next to me or at some remove. Third-person pronouns may be present but simply not speaking, in the distance but visible, or completely off the scene and out of sight. In other words, they are not actually defined by position at all, but rather by non-participation in a speech-act. Consequently, third-person

pronouns minus their proper original deictic values. In general, deictics vary in their roles from language to language even when they involve etymologically related forms. New deictics may be formed as derivatives of old ones, e.g., Latin *iste* most likely is a derivative of *is*, and Greek οὗτος is a complex accretion of ὀ- and το- with a particle *(α)υ- interposed. Cf. Levinson 1983.54–95.

4 On ego-centric deixis, see esp. Lyons 1977.686–87 and Levinson 1983.61.

5 On occasion it may point to a bystander, as part of the conversational group (Levinson 1983.68).

6 On first and second vs. third person as an opposition between presence and absence, see Benveniste 1971.195–204 and 217–22, who draws on Arabic grammarians.

7 Some deictic systems, for example, Classical Armenian—the I.E. language having the most fully articulated system of three-way personal deixis (Klein 1996)—metaphorically associate distance (third-person deixis) with lack of interest, non-empathy, and negation, and proximity (first-person deixis) with heightened involvement and interest. Likewise, in Latin, which also has a three-way deictic system, second-person deixis may signal a pejorative disposition toward a referent.

deictics commonly assume the role of simple referers or anaphors, as discussed below.⁸

Time deixis is either geared to the *origo* of the speaking “I” or projected onto the listening “you.” In everyday conversation, these paired interlocutors share a time frame, “now”—a case of *deictic simultaneity*—whereas in poetry, encoding time and decoding or reception time are often distinct, and time references may oscillate between them. Verb tenses are defined relative to the deictic center in play, the *origo*, which again, in poetry, may oscillate between “I” and “you.” (See D’Alessio, this volume, and, on time deixis in general, Fillmore 1997.67–74 and Levinson 1983.73–79.)⁹

The opposition here/not here in spatial deixis may be expressed adverbially (here/there), pronominally (this/that), or adjectivally (this/that). The members of this opposition are unequal, in that this/here is rigorously delimited, or marked, as proximal by its point of reference to the *origo*, whereas that/there is, in principle, unmarked, limited only by the bounds of the actual or conceived universe. Though these relationships are static, there is a dynamic dimension as well, since adverbial spatial deictics normally come in triplets: a static locative, a goal-oriented allative, and an ablative that emanates from a source, as in English here/hither/hence and there/thither/thence, respectively.¹⁰ The two non-static members of the triad find lexical expression in certain verbal pairs: in English, come/go,¹¹ arrive/leave, give/take, buy/sell, etc; likewise in other languages. Prepositions as prefixes strengthen and, in the case of unmarked verbs, specify directionality.

8 Sometimes languages introduce a third term to represent an intermediate degree of deixis (cf., in Latin, *iste*, beside *hic* and *ille*, and, in Early Modern English, a less clearly distal “that” beside a more decidedly distal “yon”). The proximal and distal values of *hic* and *ille*, respectively, are immediately apparent, the second-person value of *iste* less so. In Greek, the terms of this opposition are ὄδε (a proximal deictic seen in oaths and gestures), οὐτος, and κείνος.

9 On the correlation of tense and point of view, see Bakker 1997c.7–54; he finds that Thucydides uses the aorist to express the external point of view of the narrative, the imperfect to express the internal point of view. On tense, aspect, and the augment in Homer in relation to *enargeia*, see Bakker 1993 and 1999a.1–19.

10 The same is seen in Latin *hic/hinc/huc*, *illic/illinc/illuc*, *istic/istinc/istuc* and, in Greek, ἔνθα/ἐνθάδε/ἐνθεν.

11 In Greek, εἶμι, “go” and λείπω, “leave” are essentially centrifugal, ἦλθον, “came” and ἀφικνέομαι, “arrive” centripetal, and ἔρχομαι, “come” or “go” unmarked as to directionality. On εἶμι/ἦλθον as paradigmatic for the opposition centrifugal vs. centripetal, see Létoublon 1985. For English come/go, see Fillmore 1997.77–102.

Finally, whereas “real” deictic pronouns refer immediately to real objects in the external world that have so far been unknown—or at least not yet introduced into discourse—anaphoric pronouns take up again objects previously mentioned in the discourse or about to be mentioned.¹² Technically, anaphors point backward (ana-) to a referent previously designated by a noun, cataphors forward (cata-); but both are generally subsumed under the category “anaphora.” Since their localization as non-participants in the speech-act is irrelevant, third-person pronouns tend to assume a freer range of employment than first- and second-person pronouns. Typically demonstrative in origin, they take on, in addition to their deictic distal values, the role of a general referer with bleached or zero-degree deixis.¹³

From a psychological perspective, anaphora presupposes that sender and receiver (or speaker and addressee) both have access to the discourse as a whole “to such an extent that wandering is possible, comparable to the wandering of the gaze on an optically present object” (Bühler 1990.138).¹⁴ Although in recent literature, anaphora is, at times, interpreted more broadly to include pointing at abstract events or ideas such as the enunciation of the poem or its reception, I prefer to treat that kind of self-reflexive deixis as a hybrid of ocular, anaphoric, and fictional deixis, as discussed above. With these preliminary remarks about the linguistics of deixis in mind, we now turn to the poetic employments of deixis. The reader is invited to consult the Glossary on pp. 445.

12 Apollonius Dyscolus from Alexandria, in his systematic treatise on pronouns, *Peri Antonymias* (second century C.E.), defines deixis and anaphora, linking the former to primary acquaintance (πρώτη γνῶσις) and the latter to secondary acquaintance (δευτέρα γνῶσις), thus marking the one as “new” and the other as “given.” (On the polysemy of anaphora, see note 2, above.)

13 In English, “he,” “she,” “it,” and “they” function anaphorically; the same is true of Latin *is/ea/id* and Greek ἐκεῖνος and, archaically, οὗτος. The pronoun αὐτός, clearly an aggregate of αὐ and το-, has emphatic anaphoric value when it means “same, self;” but employed outside of the nominative case, it is a simple anaphoric.

14 Cf. the strictly grammatical and sequence-internal relationships of anaphoric pronouns within the correlative diptych, in which a paired referential sequence corresponds to what we would call a restrictive relative clause, as at *Il.* 1.218: “Whoever obeys the gods. . . , unto him they hearken.” Such constructions provide definition and identity to an antecedent (ὅς, “whoever”) whose referent (αὐτοῦ, “him”) is otherwise incomplete. Note that under such circumstances, questions of position are irrelevant.

THE POETICS OF DEIXIS

Ocular deictics in performance poetry point extra-textually to objects or properties surrounding the discourse and visible in the extra-linguistic context of the utterance. Together with proper names and place names, such deictic forms may become unintelligible once the original performance context has disappeared or been effaced. The survival of Greek poetry, once performed at a specific occasion, as *transcripts* unloosed from their original context (Nagy 1996.151–86) presents the interpreter with a challenge that a deictic analysis may help to resolve. Key questions are: Do the ocular deictics refer exclusively to the first, real performance of a poem? Do they provide crucial clues, enabling us to reconstruct the “facts” of that performance? Or can such deictics be seen as true shifters (Jakobson 1971), independent of any possible first performance? Has the poet already anticipated a communicative impasse and built flexibility into the deictic patterns? Or are later auditors (at whatever re-performances may have taken place) and distant readers disadvantaged in understanding the “real” meaning of ocular deixis?

In spoken language, as stated above, the *origo* is normally defined by the self, the *ego* functioning as speaker. But even in everyday speech, the role of speaker is constantly changing, bringing into play as many *egos* as there are participants in a conversational interaction. The resultant deictic shift takes place, broadly speaking, *ad oculos*, before the eyes of the interlocutors, as “I” and “you” repeatedly switch roles. From time to time, in conversation, the *origo* may be anchored more to “I” or more to “you.”

In poetic language, *ego* may shift in several additional and subtle ways. For example, an author—whether an oral storyteller, a character-narrator, or a literate composer—may create a universe of discourse outside him- or herself and purposely yield his or her position in the slot *ego/nunc* to imagined events and characters. In this type of imaginary displacement—Bühler’s imagination-oriented deixis (1990.137–57)—time and space are not to be understood concretely within the lifetime and before the eyes of the speaker/composer as in ocular deixis. Instead, that figure has created a new *origo* as the place on the grid where “I,” “here,” and “now” intersect: at it he situates not only himself but the listener/reader, and from it he orients all subsequent activities—in front of, in back of, or alongside it; going from or coming to it, etc. In other words, once an *origo* is imagined into existence, other coordinates are easily mapped onto the grid, newly perceptible to the mind’s eye. A. Fuchs (1993.57) compares such reorientation to metaphor,

where “the use of a sign is extended to a content in a ‘universe of discourse’ not normally associated with it.” In “deictic projection,” she writes, “the definitional ‘here-and-now’ situational schema of interpretation is extended to a situation that is not actually our present one.”

This brings us to an important contribution of Bühler, the identification of three distinct kinds of displacement in imagination-oriented deixis. For the sake of clarity, I will name them, for now, “centrifugal ablative,” “centripetal allative,” and “static locative.” To illustrate these, Bühler resorts to a parable: either Mohammed goes to the mountain, or the mountain comes to Mohammed,¹⁵ or, as an intermediate case between remaining here and going there, both Mohammed and the mountain remain where they are, but Mohammed perceives the mountain and, in his mind’s eye, may even conceive of himself as virtually there.¹⁶ For Bühler, in this third scenario, the one having the experience not only visualizes the absent thing but mentally moves in its direction (1990.152). This weaker form of deictic displacement falls short of a full deictic shift.

In general, displacements challenge audiences to establish, by inference, the pragmatic/contextual anchoring of the discourse in order to apprehend what is not self-evident (see Bonifazi, this volume, on implicature). The resultant participation in the process of making meaning intensifies their response to what they hear, making them work harder and therefore become all the more engaged. In this way, displaced deixis may offer, as one of its poetic consequences, ample compensation for the loss of original immediacy.¹⁷

Employment of deixis to create poetic effects is the general topic of our volume on *The Poetics of Deixis in Alcman, Pindar, and Other Lyric*. We have restricted ourselves to the texts, or transcripts, of ancient Greek lyric,

15 As Bühler (1990.150) remarks, “What is imagined, especially when movable things such as people are concerned, often comes to us, that is, into the given order of actual perception.”

16 For pioneering work on the “you are there” phenomenon in fiction, see Duchan 1995, esp. E. M. Segal 1995.3–17, Zubin and Hewitt 1995.129–55, and Bruder 1995.243–60. The essays in this book use narratological and linguistic theory to address the poetics of involvement.

17 On the deixis of immediacy and displacement, see Chafe 1994.195–211. On *enargeia*, “vividness,” and orality, see Bakker 1993, 1997a, 1997b.77–79, and 1997c.7–54. He defines *enargeia* (1997b.7) as “the power of language to create a vivid presence that is ultimately connected with the emotions of those perceiving it.”

with an especial emphasis on the victory odes of Pindar (D'Alessio, Athanassaki, Martin, Felson, Bonifazi, Calame) and on Alcman's *Partheneion* (Peponi). We highlight these two poets because interpreters of their poems have had to cope with problems that arise from the effacement of the original context, and because these poets manipulate deixis in subtle and varied ways. We hope, in addition, to make a substantive contribution to an understanding of deixis and genre, though much work on that topic lies ahead of us.

The seven essays in this special issue demonstrate a variety of ways in which deictic analysis can be applied to Greek lyric poetry. Though focused on performance texts, they should also illuminate texts that are meant to be read and not heard or seen, prose as well as poetry. The principles that underlie this field of study pertain not only to all human speech but also to all literary representations of human speech. Study of poetic deixis thus leads one to investigate the very nature of fictionality, since fictional deixis is at the heart of poetic enchantment (θέλησις).

G. B. D'Alessio provides a systematic study of temporal deixis in choral poetry: Alcman, Bacchylides, Pindaric victory odes and fragments. He identifies as "mediated communication" every kind of oral poetry that is not the product of extempore improvisation in performance. A "necessary fiction" arises for such poetry composed to be performed at a different place and at a different moment from its composition: the temporal *origo*, shifting along the text, fluctuates between the coding time (CT) and reception time (RT). This type of fiction differs from other, more free-ranging fictionality, yet both are instances of imagination-oriented deixis. In some cases, D'Alessio argues, the distinction between these two deictic moments is effaced and "deictic simultaneity" at RT results. Futures in such mediated communications partake of necessary fictionality, making such labels as performative and encomiastic less than useful. Drawing on comparative material from Provençal poetry and other song cultures, D'Alessio illustrates the clever use of oscillations between CT and RT as a feature widely attested in performance poetry. Then, in his final section, he examines cases in which the past time of myth is re-enacted in the ritual present through texts whose deictic reference merges both temporal levels.

For Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi, Alcman's Louvre *Partheneion* offers a crucial moment for the study of deixis, not only because it is the oldest extensive sample of choral poetry, but because, by constantly thematizing the extra-linguistic context of its own performance, this song turns deictic coordinates into a major topic of its discourse. Peponi's paper concentrates

on the aspect of deictic function that relates to sight. While the dense deictic network of the song shows the chorus's unremitting interest in directing the audience's sight toward the developing ritual, the interweaving of deixis with metaphor constantly alternates between mere vision and imaginary visualization. Through this rapid shifting, the audience, although ostensibly summoned to perform the act of seeing (ὄρᾶν), is drawn into an intense activity of contemplating (θεωρεῖν). Thus the deictic tactics of the poem pose questions relating to visual perception and, ultimately, to cognition. Finally, understanding the interaction between the deictic and metaphoric mechanics of this choral piece illuminates major interpretive problems that the fragment has generated since its publication in 1885.

In her study of Pindar's *First Olympian Ode*, Lucia Athanassaki analyzes the types of person deixis established between the participants in the communicative act (*laudator*, *laudandus*, heroes, and gods), their temporal and spatial localizations, and the interaction of these localizations in the course of the performance. Her aim is to explore the inscribed performative strategies and to assess their significance for Pindaric poetics. By tracking the pathway of *ego*, she shows that this first-person figure "visits" the mythic world of Pelops, particularly when addressing the re-envisioned hero through apostrophe—a case of Mohammed going to the mountain. This poetic speech-act engages *ego* in projected deixis, and the Pindaric audiences accompany him. Because of its deictic pattern, Athanassaki argues, *Olympian 1* is especially suitable for performance and re-performance—not only in the victor's homeland of Syracuse but at Olympia as well. She suggests, moreover, that whatever the original mode of performance, the symmetrical alternation of second- and third-person deixis in the mythical and encomiastic sections allows for monodic, choral, or even mixed execution. In terms of poetics, she concludes, the underlying performative strategies strengthen Pindar's claim to be a master of truth.

Richard Martin argues that *Pythian 8*, probably the last epinician Pindar composed, is unusual in the way it ties the victor's home island to a number of other landscapes. His paper traces several elaborate figural systems that Pindar employs to map out a vast parallel space within which gods, heroes, athletes, kings, mortals, and poets interact. The specific technique employed to bring about this poetic effect involves intensive use of several varieties of deixis. Alongside the familiar configuration of demonstratives and other deictic markers, the poet draws on what might be termed "embedded" or "implicit" deictics by using verbs that imply contact or

distance, including verbs of directed motion, or deictic verbs. Martin's close analysis of such deictics in *Pythian* 8 enables him to explicate some of the notoriously difficult passages in the ode and offers, in addition, a useful tool for reading other archaic Greek poetry, choral and monodic.

In my treatment of deixis in *Pythian* 9, I examine several kinds of deixis and several degrees of deictic displacement. Ocular deixis in the programmatic opening of the ode (1–4) never directly designates Cyrene in the *hic et nunc*; instead, “now” seems to coincide with the anticipated moment, future yet imminent, when Cyrene will welcome the victor, a moment perhaps realized in the ode itself when *ego* addresses Telesicrates. The ocular deixis in the intervening mythic exchange between Apollo and Cheiron specifically anchors their conversation in Thessaly, but once the centaur begins uttering his prophecy, fictional deixis takes over, imaginatively transporting the god and his bride (but not the centaur) to Cyrene at a time just anterior to its founding. When *ego* resumes his narrative at verses 71–75 with the announcement of Telesicrates' victory at Delphi and his prediction that Cyrene will receive him wholeheartedly, the future verb δέξεται, coupled with a poetic sojourn at Thebes, “delays” their celebration. Pragmatically, the sojourn at the outskirts of Thebes, replete with its local heroes and the inspirational waters of Dirce, gives the audience imaginative access to the locus of poetic composition and inspiration even as it contributes to the formation of an epinician trope. That is, the audience is oriented in the direction of the poet's own hometown: Mohammed (*ego*) sees the mountain (Thebes) in his vicinity but never goes there. The city of Thebes, however, by its special connection to the deictic *ego*, functions as an indexical sign of *ego* and his creative process, and he can “return” to it (in this and other odes) with relative ease. The celebration seems to be enacted once *ego* uses second-person deixis and apostrophizes Telesicrates, affirming his co-presence with the victor, probably at Cyrene.

Anna Bonifazi examines the obstacles a critic faces in trying to reconstruct a first-performance climate or context. In the course of her exploration of place and person deixis in Pindaric victory odes, she proposes a classification of deictic practices according to the pragmatic acts that underlie them. Using a cognitive approach, she seeks to assess the degree of communication that takes place despite the erasure of the original setting. The removal of objects to which ocular deixis might once have pointed leaves the Pindarist, she argues, in a state of radical *aporia*: the transcript of the ode cannot communicate across languages and cultures. Nevertheless,

from this acknowledgement of an absence comes something positive: a recognition that the actual goal of epinician deixis is not unequivocally to refer to something or somebody, but rather to create ambiguity and inclusiveness. This contributes to *enargeia* on the part of the reader: the absence triggers hard work and thus engagement.

Finally, Claude Calame directs us to think about the differences between performance poetry and poetry to be read. His study underscores the permeability, in both performed and read poetry, of the boundary between what is “inside” and “outside” a poem. A poem, he argues, may enact its own ritual performance using discourse deictics that point self-reflexively to its own making. Such discourse deictics not only bring the poem into real existence, they simultaneously point, repeatedly, to that emergent poem. Thus Calame argues that discourse deictics can designate both extra- and intra-discursively what is being created poetically and fictionally within the discourse. This conflation of intra- and extra-discursive modalities of reference produces a certain semantic density in the enunciative positions constructed within the discourse. It occurs particularly when a poem corresponds to an act of singing that involves a ritual or cultic presentation, as in the case of a Pindaric ode composed for a ritual celebration in praise of an Olympian victor, a poem that creates its own context of enunciation. In read poetry, however (for example, the poems of Theocritus and Callimachus), deixis is always fictional—Bühler’s deixis *am Phantasma*.

Archaic choral lyric, in general, poses crucial questions regarding deixis and performance, questions that all seven contributions illuminate. They all focus especially on the Alcmanic and Pindaric poems because it is in these long choral compositions that deictic issues are clearly raised and can be analytically investigated.

THE CRITIC AS TANTALUS?

A deictic approach may help us extract more performance details from the transcript of a performance poem than has been done up to now. That is, if ocular deictics once anchored an ode by pointing to the site and occasion of its first performance, such deictics—together, in the case of victory odes, with the naming of the victor, his family, and his homeland—would be expected to “rigidly designate” those lost features in all possible subsequent receptions of the ode.¹⁸ Thus the ode would be intelligible to

new, non-local audiences who could re-imagine a lost historical performance context and even imaginatively occupy the homeland space.¹⁹ They, as well as all later auditors/readers, would re-experience, vicariously, what it was like to be among that original local audience, which included fellow citizens of the victor.²⁰

One problem with this rosy scenario is the difficulty, in interpreting lyric, of distinguishing ocular from imaginary pointing, since they both tend to employ the same deictic forms. A poet might use deictic language to *create* (rather than simply to designate) referents in the extra-linguistic context or might leave the deictics intentionally polysemous, with a view to future re-performances, formal, semi-formal, or informal, or future readings.²¹ Once the poems became dislodged from their initial deictic anchoring, the polysemy would allow later audiences to take the ocular deixis as referring to their own surroundings. At the same time, however, deictic conventions might guide them instead—in the case of epinician odes, for example—to localize the reception of the poem (unless otherwise specified) in the victor’s hometown, either at the moment of the victor’s return or slightly before. If such a localization were not factually the case, those at the first performance would experience the incongruity as a “necessary fiction”—a form, I believe, of imaginative deixis. In like manner, the system of deictics might even situate a hometown audience in a fictional setting

18 Kripke 1972.253–355, using “Hitler,” “Cicero,” and “Jack the Ripper” as his cases in point, develops the notion of a rigid designator as a name that “designates the same thing in all possible worlds,” wherever “we use *English* with *our* meanings and *our* references” (289–90, emphasis in original).

19 On the plausibility of re-performances, see esp. Hubbard 2004, who suggests a scenario of re-performance at the next pan-Hellenic festival, and Currie 2004, who proposes three types of scenarios—informal, semi-formal, and formal civic. Ancient evidence for re-performances of a variety of genres of poetry can be found in Herington 1985.28, 41–57, 181–91, and 207–10. On reconstructing the lost choreography for Pindaric victory odes from the surviving metrical patterns, see Mullen 1982.

20 This view of the ongoing power of the nexus of deictics over new audiences, including readers, finds a parallel in Harry Berger’s notion of “imaginary audition” (Berger 1989.xiv and 98–103). Readers of *Richard II*, Berger argues, may combine stage-centered hearing with text-centered reading of the originally performed Shakespearean play. These later “auditory-readers” would have access to a plenitude not available to the original hearing audience; they could then superimpose their new readings upon their simulated first-performance experience.

21 On re-performance, see note 19 above; also Athanassaki, this volume, and Cingano 2003.

incongruent with where they in fact are. Finally, the absence of deictic anchoring in the victor's hometown would not prove that a particular ode was *not* first performed there. Familiarity with epinician conventions regarding deixis thus is key to interpreting the odes, whether one is a member of the original audience or of subsequent audiences and distant readerships, and whether that original audience is in the hometown of the victor or not. Situatedness may matter less in other forms of choral lyric.

Many challenges remain to tantalize us, with the field of inquiry into the poetic uses of ocular and imagination-oriented deixis still wide open. Indeed, the current emphasis in classics on performance texts of all sorts will, we hope, inspire classicists to refine the tools of deictic analysis and appropriate the insights and methods of scholars working on deixis from linguistic and sociological as well as literary perspectives. Perhaps we critics will "capture" in language the powerful yet elusive deictic practices of the poetry we study. With this inaugural volume, we hope to facilitate such a triumph and to illuminate the poetics of deixis from all these angles.²²

22 Five of the papers in this volume were delivered at a Conference on "Deixis in Fiction and Performance," held in June 2000 at the European Cultural Centre of Delphi. We are all deeply indebted to its Director, Professor Vassilis Karasmanis, and his staff for their support and warm hospitality. Gratitude is due to my co-organizers, Egbert J. Bakker, Jenny Strauss Clay, David Konstan, and Jared Klein, and to Lucia Athanassaki and all of the other conference participants for making the event so congenial and stimulating. For facilitating this special issue so good-naturedly and wisely, I would like to express my appreciation to *Arethusa* Editor Martha Malamud and Managing Editor Madeleine Kaufman, and, for timely feedback and insightful criticism, to David Konstan. Finally, I am indebted to my colleagues Seth L. Schein, Richard Parmentier, and Egbert Bakker, and to the other six contributors, for helping me make this introduction as hospitable as possible to the novitiate. Thanks also to Kristin R. Hood and Ellen Harris for general editorial advice.