EPINICIAN APOLLO IN STORY TIME: *PYTHIAN* 9, *OLYMPIAN* 6 AND *PYTHIAN* 3[1]

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Stories require that a character move through time, surmounting obstacles and resolving dilemmas. They often begin with desire and end with fulfillment or non-fulfillment, *satisfaction ou insatisfaction* (Bremond 153–62), a movement from lack to lack liquidated (Propp 35–36 and 53–55).[2] It follows that any poet who makes Apollo the protagonist in a story—as a subject who desires or a hero on a quest—is fashioning a story-character who is logically inconsistent. For the god of prophecy transcends time and never experiences *aporia*, as the centaur Cheiron reminds him at Pindar's *Pythian* 9.44–50: κύριον ὃς πάντων τέλος / οἶσθα καὶ πάσας κελεύθους ("you who know / the appointed end of all things and all their ways").[3] Yet, in stories Apollo frequently fails to attain his desires right away, whether he is seeking a birthplace, an oracular home, or a particular maiden; and then, to achieve his end, he resorts to force, or the threat of force. In short, he terrorizes not only transgressors but anyone unwilling to embrace him on his own terms. As such a protagonist, he scarcely resembles the omniscient god who prophesies to petitioners at Delphi and embodies the maxims inscribed on the *pronaos* of his sanctuary, 'Know thyself' and 'Nothing too much.'

Of course, Apollo is by no means the only Olympian whose representation in stories may strike auditors as incongruous: anthropomorphism itself supplies many such incongruities for poets in various genres to exploit. Gods fall victim to their own special powers or step too far outside their own

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[1] It is with pleasure that I express my profound gratitude to the European Cultural Centre in Delphi, which hosted "Apolline Politics and Poetics: An International Symposium" in July 2003, and to the organizers, V. Karasmanis, L. Athanassaki, R. P. Martin, and J. F. Miller, who helped make this conference memorable and who have edited this volume.

[2] Propp 79–80 identifies seven *dramatis personae* among whom the 31 *functions* he extracts from 100 Russian fairytales are distributed, and Greimas 209 distills these personae into six standard grammatical roles he calls *actants*. On narratological treatments of character see Rimmon-Kenan 29–42, Ducrot and Todorov 221–26, and Bal 25–37.

[3] I have used the Snell–Maehler edition and have quoted from Race's translation, with occasional adaptations.

domains in the Homeric epics and the Hymns; their mishaps elicit a humor inherent in the unexpected, *aprosdokêton*, and in reversals of roles. Amusement arises, for example, when "even in the heart of Aphrodite herself Zeus cast sweet longing / to make love with a mortal man" (*H. Aphr.* 45–46), or when Aphrodite receives no sympathy from her father Zeus after she is wounded by Diomedes and flees, dripping *ichôr*, to Mt. Olympus (*Il.* 5.352–430).[4] While the timeless gods suffer no long-term consequences when they engage with humans in human activities, the situation for their mortal partners may quickly darken, as it does for Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae* and for Hippolytus and Phaedra in his *Hippolytus*. Clearly, for the human partner, intercourse with a god (or goddess) leads to a life that is volatile and fraught with danger.

Of all the Olympians, however, Loxian Apollo offers the poet as story-teller a special challenge and special opportunity, since, as Zeus's son and the god of prophecy, he quintessentially transcends time. Poets tend to depict the god operating in two registers at once, one that is human and inside story time, the other timeless and divine. Apollo's youth renders him more malleable than a fully mature god as matter for a story. Poets can fashion him inside time, as a figure evolving toward adulthood who often falters along the way, seeks advice from a mentor, and 'initiates' young girls into Eros. In addition, they can relegate time-bound events to the past or locate them within a frame that depicts or evokes the transcendent god. Finally, poets can place signs in the text that call attention to an incongruity, as for example an interlocutor's laugh or smile or even a reminder to the god that he is, as it were, out of character.[5]

Pindar employs all these strategies in his representations of Apollo as an epinician character within epinician myth. His Apollo inside time is always eclipsed and framed by the timeless Apollo, the founding god of the Pythian Games, whose victors his Pythian odes celebrate. Thus the very circumstances surrounding the Games, and hence the victory odes, situate epinician myth inside

[4] Quotes for the *Homeric Hymns* are from the translation by Shelmerdine, based on the Oxford text edited by T. W. Allen. For the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* I have used Allen's Oxford editions and have quoted from the translations by Lattimore 1951 and 1967, respectively.

[5] In Euripidean tragedy judgments about a god's all-too-human behavior are implicit in the old servant's prayer to Cypris at *Hipp*. 114–20 to show forgiveness and be wiser than mortals, and explicit at various points in the *Ion*, as when Creusa informs Ion of Apollo's crimes against her "friend" (338) and Ion invokes the absent god to seek the path of virtue, and not force a girl against her will and then betray her and leave a child born in secret to die (436–44); similarly, at *Ba*. 1348, Cadmus calls upon Dionysus and exclaims "It is not fitting for gods to resemble mortals in dispositions (*orgas*)."

a timeless frame, within which the poet can take liberties without seriously undermining the god. In *Pythian* 9, *Olympian* 6, and *Pythian* 3, these liberties include presenting the god as a hero on an amorous quest,[6] showing him, simultaneously, as both a remote *and* a caring mate/father, and portraying him as a cuckold who eventually gets his revenge. In *P*. 9.42–43 Cheiron remarks on the oddity of the god's behavior and reminds him of his omniscience and aversion to lies; in *O*. 6.67 and *P*. 3.29–30, the poet as story-teller inserts similar comments. Such incongruities would be amusing to Pindar's audiences. Ultimately, the frame, which is by definition not anthropocentric, ensures a positive depiction of the god, no matter what he does to humans.

The unusually positive nature of epinician Apollo stands in contrast to his portrayal in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, where a series of land-maidens, fearful of being dominated, refuse first to be his birthplace and later to be the site of his oracle. Delos best expresses that fear but speaks for all the god's actual and potential victims when she tells Leto (67–69):

> λίην γάρ τινά φασιν ἀτάσθαλον Ἀπόλλωνα
> ἔσσεσθαι, μέγα δὲ πρυτανευσέμεν ἀθανάτοισι
> καὶ θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσιν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν.
>
> They say that Apollo will be one that is very reckless
> and will greatly lord it over immortals
> and mortals all over the fruitful earth.

The outcome that Delos dreads is annihilation—submersion into the sea, a kind of reverse creation (70–73):

> τῷ ῥ' αἰνῶς δείδοικα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν
> μὴ ὁπότ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ἴδῃ φάος ἠελίοιο,
> νῆσον ἀτιμήσας, ἐπεὶ ἦ κραναήπεδός εἰμι,
> ποσσὶ καταστρέψας ὤσῃ ἁλὸς ἐν πελάγεσσιν.
>
> Therefore, I greatly fear in heart and spirit
> that as soon as he first sees the light of the sun,
> he will scorn this island, for truly I have but a hard, rocky soil,
> and overturn me and thrust me down with his feet in the depths of the sea.

[6] In all three odes the god occupies the boundary, or *limen*, between boyhood and manhood, as marked by his unshorn hair; see, for example, *P*. 9.7 and *P*. 3.14 (cf. *I*. 1.7 and *Pa*. 9.45).

The rocky island nevertheless agrees to be Apollo's birthplace, but only after she exacts from Leto a great oath that her son (soon-to-be-born) will "build on her a glorious temple to be an oracle for men, then . . . afterwards make temples and wooded groves amongst all men; for surely he will be greatly renowned" (80–82). Leto swears her powerful oath and adds, at line 88, that Apollo will honor Delos above all others.

The *atasthalia* that Delos "greatly fears" from Apollo is regularly associated with reckless youths, as in *Od*.8.166, where Odysseus reproaches the rude Phaeacian youth Euryalus for not speaking nobly: "you seem like one who is reckless" (an *atasthalos anêr*), he tells him. This human trait justifies divine retaliation, as Zeus maintains when he places Aigisthos in the category of humans who "themselves, / through their own blind folly, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained" (*Od*. 1.33–34. οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ / σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν). This rubric accommodates not only Penelope's suitors, who are repeatedly associated with *hubris* and *atasthalia*, but also Odysseus' companions (1.7) and the wayward maidservants (19.88): all, like Aigisthos, experience early death.

Delos fears the very fate that Telphusa suffers later in the *Hymn* as punishment for deceiving the god and refusing to harbor his oracle. The island's unrealized but dreaded outcome is thus the actual outcome for Telphusa, once Phoebus Apollo sees that the fair-flowing spring has tricked him (379–87):

> Τελφοῦσ', οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλες ἐμὸν νόον ἐξαπαφοῦσα
> χῶρον ἔχουσ' ἐρατὸν προρέειν καλλίρροον ὕδωρ.
> ἐνθάδε δὴ καὶ ἐμὸν κλέος ἔσσεται, οὐδὲ σὸν οἴης.
> ἦ καὶ ἐπὶ ῥίον ὦσεν ἄναξ ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων
> πετραίῃς προχυτῇσιν, ἀπέκρυψεν δὲ ῥέεθρα,
> καὶ βωμὸν ποιήσατ' ἐν ἄλσεϊ δενδρήεντι
> ἄγχι μάλα κρήνης καλλιρρόου· ἔνθα δ' ἄνακτι
> πάντες ἐπίκλησιν Τελφουσίῳ εὐχετόωνται
> οὕνεκα Τελφούσης ἱερῆς ἤσχυνε ῥέεθρα.
>
> "Telphusa, you were not, after all, by deceiving my mind,
> to keep to yourself this lovely place and pour forth your clear flowing water:
> here my renown shall also be and not yours alone."
>
> Thus spoke the lord, far-working Apollo, and pushed over upon her a crag
> with a shower of rocks; he hid her streams

> and made himself an altar in a wooded grove
> very near a clear-flowing spring. In that place
> all men pray to the great one by the name Telphusian,
> because he disgraced the stream of holy Telphusa.

Delos' dread of eclipse leads her to articulate one prominent Apolline trait—his ephebic urge to dominate, colonize, possess, rape, and obliterate. This proclivity makes the god a colorful and dynamic if not always dignified character in stories. In the *Hymn* the god dominates a series of female adversaries, lands, virgins, and even the dragoness Pytho, who can be seen to embody female rage and resistance to domination.[7] When, on the other hand, he encounters a compliant female, he rewards her with gilded efflorescence—the outcome for the island of Delos at 135–39 (cf. Callimachus's *Hymn to Delos* 260–63).

PINDAR, *PYTHIAN* 9

In this ode celebrating the victory of Telesicrates of Cyrene in a *hoplitodromos*, Pindar sustains a positive attitude toward Apollo's sexual and colonizing exploits. Only the story pattern itself suggests violence, underscored by the verb *harpas*' (6).[8] This kind of violence might have incurred blame, as it does from Creusa in Euripides' *Ion*, who tells Ion of her 'friend' whom Apollo first raped, then abandoned and deprived of her child (338–89), and from Ion, who reacts to her narrative before realizing he is that very child (436–51). To deflect such blame from the ephebic Apollo, Pindar manipulates the mythic narrative of lines 5–70, both by foregrounding the god's transformation of Cyrene and by controlling who speaks about the god. In addition, the words and action of two characters help mitigate the violence of the rape: Cheiron by his gentle chiding and Aphrodite by her gentle touch. Even though, earlier in the poem, a desirous and ephebic Apollo delivers a speech to the centaur that transgresses divine and human norms, in the end his actions toward the nymph colonize the land and

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[7] Pytho, enraged at being supplanted by the young male intruder, resembles the Erinyes of Aesch. *Eum*., before Athena tames and transforms them. On the limits of their domestification, see Bacon.

[8] On the implications of the use of *harpas*' (3), "seized, raped," particularly in connection to the violence of colonization, see Dougherty 141–46. On rape by divinities, see Larson 67, Stewart, and Zeitlin. On the rape of the Leukippides—girls of marriageable age—by the Dioskouroi, see Calame 185–91.

fulfill Cheiron's prophecy. Thus in the story the god enacts and instantiates two of his own special domains.

Pindar freely enlivens the Apollo–Cyrene narrative. He presents Apollo as an ephebe "with flowing hair" (5 *chaitaeis*) on the verge of experiencing his first love affair with the Thessalian maiden who has won his admiration. He dramatizes Apollo's youthful innocence by presenting a face-to-face exchange between god and centaur. Apollo begins with an exhortation to Cheiron to leave his holy cave and "marvel at this woman's courage and great power / and at what a fight she is waging with fearless mind / a girl whose heart is superior to toil / and whose mind remains unshaken by storms of fear" (30–32 σεμνὸν ἄντρον, Φιλλυρίδα, προλιπὼν θυμὸν γυναικὸς καὶ μεγάλαν δύνασιν / θαύμασον, οἷον ἀταρβεῖ νεῖκος ἄγει κεφαλᾷ, / μόχθου καθύπερθε νεᾶνις/ ἦτορ ἔχοισα· φόβῳ δ᾽ οὐ κεχείμανται φρένες). Then, at 33–37, he begins his petition:

τίς νιν ἀνθρώπων τέκεν; ποίας δ᾽ ἀποσπασθεῖσα φύτλας
ὀρέων κευθμῶνας ἔχει σκιοέντων,
γεύεται δ᾽ ἀλκᾶς ἀπειράντου;
ὁσία κλυτὰν χέρα οἱ προσενεγκεῖν
ἦρα καὶ ἐκ λεχέων κεῖραι μελιηδέα ποίαν;

"What mortal bore her? From what stock has she been severed
that she lives in the glens of the shadowy mountains
and puts to the test her unbounded valor?
Is it right to lay my famous hand upon her
and indeed to reap the honey-sweet flower from the bed of love?"

Apollo's questions to Cheiron are out of character in a number of amusing ways. The god of prophecy, who must already know what will transpire, plays an inexperienced and innocent youth. His *aporia*, as a seeker-hero in a story, is an illogical condition for this transcendent god. His use of *hosia* (36 "Is it holy . . .?) accentuates the discrepancy between the respectful form of his question and its bold content, introducing an irony that Cheiron sustains and matches in his admonitory reply (39–49):

κρυπταὶ κλαΐδες ἐντὶ σοφᾶς Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων,
Φοῖβε, καὶ ἔν τε θεοῖς τοῦτο κἀνθρώποις ὁμῶς
αἰδέοντ᾽, ἀμφανδὸν ἁδείας τυχεῖν τὸ πρῶτον εὐνᾶς.

καὶ γὰρ σέ, τὸν οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγεῖν,
ἔτραπε μείλιχος ὀργὰ παρφάμεν τοῦτον λόγον. κούρας δ᾽ ὁπόθεν γενεάν
ἐξερωτᾷς, ὦ ἄνα; κύριον ὃς πάντων τέλος
οἶσθα καὶ πάσας κελεύθους·
ὅσσα τε χθὼν ἠρινὰ φύλλ᾽ ἀναπέμπει, χὠπόσαι
ἐν θαλάσσᾳ καὶ ποταμοῖς ψάμαθοι
κύμασιν ῥιπαῖς τ᾽ ἀνέμων κλονέονται, χὤ τι μέλλει, χὠπόθεν
ἔσσεται, εὖ καθορᾷς.

Hidden are the keys to sacred
lovemaking that belong to wise Persuasion,
Phoebus, and both gods and humans alike
shy from engaging openly for the first time in sweet love.

And so a delicate impulse prompted you,
for whom it is not right to touch upon a lie, to make
that misleading speech. Do you ask from where
the girl's lineage comes, O lord? And yet you know
the appointed end of all things and all the ways to them,
and how many leaves the earth puts forth in spring,
and how many grains of sand in the sea and rivers
are beaten by the waves and blasts of wind,
and what will happen and whence
it will come—all this you discern clearly.

Cheiron reacts physically to the unexpected question—an *aprosdokêton*—by smiling freshly (38 *chloaron gelassai*s) with his gentle brow. He counsels wise Persuasion and Modesty, since "both gods and humans alike shy from engaging openly for the first time in sweet love." Before agreeing to "match wits with" (50 *antipherizai*) the god of prophecy, the centaur itemizes the god's omniscience in a number of domains that culminate in his knowledge of how many spring leaves, *êrina phull'*, the earth puts forth.[9] Unlike the leaves, Apollo transcends time. His knowledge of the transience of leaves/humans enables him to distance

[9] On the gap between the human and divine ability to describe what is unutterably huge or indescribably great, see Ford, esp. 181–84; on the seer's capacity to enumerate, Ford 86–88 and Slatkin 2004. For a similar association of the transience of humans with that of leaves, see the famous passage at *Iliad* 6.146–50; a modern handling of this theme is Gerald Manley Hopkin's "Margarete."

himself (for the moment at least) from the Trojan War and not be implicated in such ephemeral human affairs: he will not become part of the human story.[10]

Cheiron's good-natured admonition as he reminds the god of his powers underscores the incongruity of Apollo's pose as a seeker-hero. In a role reversal, with Apollo turned petitioner (Woodbury 245–58; Carson 121–28), the centaur appropriates the oracular Delphic function and proclaims the outcome of the god's erotic quest. This scene in *P*. 9 recalls an ephebic moment in Demodocus' Song of the Adultery of Ares and Aphrodite (*Od*. 8.266–366), where Apollo and Hermes, the two youngest voyeurs, exchange salacious remarks. Apollo asks Hermes (335–37) "And tell me, / would you, caught tight in these strong fastenings, be willing / to sleep in bed by the side of Aphrodite the golden?" Hermes replies (339–42) with a resounding "Yes," adding: "all you gods could be looking on and all the goddesses, / and still I would sleep by the side of Aphrodite the golden." Laughter erupts among the gods, especially at Hermes' exuberant response, recalling the laughter at Hephaestus' expense at *Iliad* 1.599–600. Here in *P*. 9 Apollo's impetuous, ephebic questions elicit a smile from the centaur as an acknowledgment of the incongruity.

OLYMPIAN 6

The most striking detail, for our purposes, in this ode to Hagesias of Syracuse for his victory in a mule race, is Pindar's presentation of Apollo's paternal treatment of his human son. In many stories of divine/human rape, particularly a god's rape of a virgin, the human offspring is neglected and goes through life in search of his absent father. This is true of Iamos in *O*. 6 as well; but when, at his critical ephebic moment, he prays to Poseidon and Apollo for guidance, Apollo responds. He addresses the youth and guides him on his journey to manhood (58–62), in the manner of a paternal mentor and a divine *kourotrophos*. When the two journey together, at *O*. 6.64, "to the steep rock of Kronos' lofty hill at Olympia," their partnership resembles that of Odysseus and Telemachus in the *Odyssey*, as they plot against and defeat the reckless suitors.

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[10] Cf. how Apollo refuses to fight Poseidon "for the sake of insignificant / mortals, who are as leaves are, and now flourish and grow warm / with life, and feed on what the ground gives, but then again / fade away and are dead" (*Il.* 21.463–66 βροτῶν ἕνεκα πτολεμίξω / δειλῶν, οἳ φύλλοισιν ἐοικότες ἄλλοτε μέν τε / ζαφλεγέες τελέθουσιν, ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδοντες, / ἄλλοτε δὲ φθινύθουσιν ἀκήριοι). "Therefore," he urges at 466–67, "let us with all speed / give up this quarrel and let the mortals fight their own battles."

At the same time that Apollo fulfills his paternal obligations to Iamos, in the human register, he also performs his divine role as guide of youths. Again, the *Odyssey* gives the earliest representation of Apollo in this function: during the interview at the hearth at *Od.* 19.86–88, the beggar-Odysseus reassures Penelope that, even if Odysseus himself has perished, "here is Telemachus, his son, by grace of Apollo (*Apollonos ge hekêti*) grown such a man, / and in his palace none of the women / will go unnoticed being reckless, since he is a child no longer."[11]

Pindar puts a positive stamp on divine rape in Iamos' lineage as he recounts Poseidon's impregnation of Pitana, who gave birth to Evadne, and Apollo's of Evadne, who gave birth to Iamos.[12] He minimizes the violence intrinsic to such tales by eliding the moment of seduction or rape. The poet-narrator locates Apollo's insemination of Evadne in an anterior story and merely summarizes it in a single line: "in submission to Apollo she first experienced sweet Aphrodite" (35 ὑπ᾽ Ἀπόλλωνι γλυκείας πρῶτον ἔψαυσ᾽ Ἀφροδίτας). Calling their lovemaking "sweet" and making Evadne the subject of the active tactile verb ψαύω, "touch," makes it appear that the maiden welcomed Apollo and willingly embraced him. Contrast the more common use in such situations of *damazô*, as when Hesiod depicts Kronos' sexual conquest of Rhea at *Theog.* 453, or *harpazô*, as in *H. Dem.* 19 and 414 (the latter from Persephone's internal focalization). Only the preposition ὑπ᾽ implies that the maiden submitted and had no choice—both because it means "below" and because it frequently accompanies a passive construction with the genitive of the agent.

From this benign description of their sweet union in the past the focus quickly shifts to the guardian's detection of Evadne's pregnancy and his "unspeakable anger," soon to be assuaged (36–38):

> οὐδ᾽ ἔλαθ᾽ Αἴπυτον ἐν παντὶ χρόνῳ κλέπτοισα θεοῖο γόνον.
> ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν Πυθῶναδ᾽, ἐν θυμῷ πιέσαις χόλον οὐ φατὸν ὀξείᾳ
> μελέτᾳ,
> ᾤχετ᾽ ἰὼν μαντευσόμενος ταύτας περ᾽ ἀτλάτου πάθας.
>
> She could not conceal from Aipytos forever that she was hiding the god's
> offspring.

[11] Cf. Stanford ad. loc., who translates the phrase "Thanks to Apollo" and adds "In his function as κουροτρόφος."

[12] Poseidon impregnates Pitana, who, concealing her pregnancy, bears Evadne and gives her to Aipytos to rear. Eventually Evadne is impregnated by Apollo; she conceals her state from Aipytos and bears Iamos.

> But he went to Pytho, suppressing the unspeakable anger in his heart
> with stern discipline,
> to obtain an oracle concerning that unbearable calamity.

Apollo takes an active role in facilitating Evadne's labor—the sign of a beneficent husband or lover, not a thoughtless adolescent rapist. While Evadne's guardian is at Delphi, the golden-haired god expedites the delivery, as if he were a Hera or an Eleithuia. He places gentle-counseling Eleithuia and the Fates beside her (41–42 τᾷ μὲν ὁ χρυσοκόμας / πραΰμητίν τ᾽ Ἐλείθυιαν παρέστασ᾽ ἔν τε Μοίρας),[13] making even her birthpangs pleasant, and the birth is quick (43–44). Following the birth, nurture, and naming of the infant, the narrative shifts to the time of Iamos' *hêbê*, "when he plucked the fruit of his delightful golden-crowned youth" (57–58 τερπνᾶς δ᾽ ἐπεὶ χρυσοστεφάνοιο λάβεν / καρπὸν Ἥβας), and to the occasion of Apollo's acceptance of his son at the river Alpheus (58–61):[14]

> Ἀλφεῷ μέσσῳ καταβαὶς ἐκάλεσσε Ποσειδᾶν᾽ εὐρυβίαν,
> ὃν πρόγονον, καὶ τοξοφόρον Δάλου θεοδμάτας σκοπόν,
> αἰτέων λαοτρόφον τιμάν τιν᾽ ἑᾷ κεφαλᾷ,
> νυκτὸς ὑπαίθριος.

> And he went down into the middle of the Alpheos
> And called upon widely ruling Poseidon,
> his [maternal] grandfather, and upon the bow-wielding watcher over god-
> built Delos,
> and under the nighttime sky asked for himself some office
> that would serve his people.

Implicit in the double invocation of Poseidon and Apollo are the unstated questions, "Who is my father?" and "Who can make me legitimate by granting my request for an 'office that would serve my people' (60 *laotrophon timan*)?" Apollo's response collapses the acceptance of his son at *hêbê* into an earlier ritual

[13] Contrast Hera's detention of Eleithuia (*H. Ap.* 97–101), which delayed the god's own birth. Here the god has the power to expedite Evadne's labor and the birth of their son.

[14] The set of sons who meet their absent or deceased fathers at *hêbê* includes Telemachus (*Od.* 1.215–16), Ion (Eur. *Ion*) and Oedipus (Soph. *OT*), among many others.

moment, the Amphidromy,[15] when a father acknowledges his son on the fifth day of his life. The mention of Aipytos' return from Delphi and his search for the child "on the fifth day" underscores this ritual link, at the same time suggesting that Evadne's guardian had tried to play the paternal role but was unable even to *find* the infant Iamos. With the words "Up, child (62 ὄρσο, τέκνον), / and follow my voice here to a land shared by all," Apollo finally fulfills his paternal role—something that other narratives of this type tend to problematize. In addition to accepting Iamos as his son and granting him the legitimacy he craves, the god also inaugurates Iamos and his lineage, the Iamidae, into the prophetic role they will henceforth perform at Olympia.

Olympian 6 highlights the auspicious birth of Iamos and his eventual initiation into his office as founder of the Iamidae at Olympia, where Hagesidamus has just won his victory. These events frame and thus temper the sexual activities of Apollo. As the one who deflowers and impregnates Evadne and later participates in the growth cycle of his time-bound son, Apollo is in intimate contact with two humans who clearly move through time—Evadne from maidenhood to conception to delivery and Iamos from birth to manhood. Yet epinician Apollo retains his numinous aura of transcendence, an aura appropriate for a god whose authority the victory ode as a genre affirms and upon whom the rituals of prophecy at Olympia depend.

PYTHIAN 3

In this epistolary ode to Hieron of Syracuse, the epinician speaker evolves from almost impious in the unreal condition, with which the poem opens, to utterly temperate with respect to content and form, both in his prayer of line 77 (*epeuxasthai . . . ethelô*) and in the future less vivid condition of the final epode.[16] Through four conditional utterances, he gradually tempers his own strong impulse to exceed the limits of proper speech. His dazzling use of conditions as a syntactic device is coupled with maxims that enable him to avoid poetic excess and to differentiate himself from two transgressive mythic characters, Coronis and Asclepius. In the first person, he enacts a respectful, pious relationship with the god who presides over the Pythian Games—a relationship that the ode's mythic characters do not enjoy.

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[15] On the Amphidromy, see esp. Schol. Plato, *Theaet*. 160e; cf. Garland 58.

[16] I follow Young 27–68, who sees the first 73 lines of the poem as an elaborate *recusatio* and argues for taking the first five lines as an unreal condition, with *chreôn* functioning independently in the protasis.

These pious speech-acts render Apollo a blameless, though vindictive, deity. The poetic *egô* neither mentions the god's violence nor allows any mythic character to speak against him. Only the story pattern itself evokes the notion of an ephebic god who ravishes young virgins and is indifferent to the consequences. With these negative characteristics of the god suppressed, a story of divine seduction and violent destruction becomes one of human crime and just divine punishment, and Apollo transcends and subordinates his ephebic, time-bound self.

A sustained analogy connects the epinician speaker to the two mythic characters whose disastrous plights he narrates. Like Coronis and Asclepius, this carefully crafted figure yearns to do the impossible—to resurrect Cheiron in order to heal the ailing tyrant of Syracuse. Yet the syntax with which he expresses that yearning is progressively self-limiting. As stated already, he accompanies his opening wish with a pious qualification (1–7):

> **ἤθελον** Χίρωνά κε Φιλλυρίδαν,
> **εἰ χρεὼν** τοῦθ᾽ ἁμετέρας ἀπὸ γλώσσας κοινὸν εὔξασθαι ἔπος,
> ζώειν τὸν ἀποιχόμενον,
> Οὐρανίδα γόνον εὐρυμέδοντα Κρόνου, βάσσαισί τ᾽ ἄρχειν
> Παλίου Φῆρ᾽ ἀγρότερον
> νόον ἔχοντ᾽ ἀνδρῶν φίλον· οἷος ἐὼν θρέψεν ποτέ
> τέκτονα νωδυνίας ἥμερον γυιαρκέος Ἀσκλαπιόν,
> ἥροα παντοδαπᾶν ἀλκτῆρα νούσων.
>
> **I would wish** that Cheiron—
> **if it were right** for my tongue to utter this common prayer—
> still lived, the departed son of Philyra
> and wide-ruling offspring of Ouranos' son Kronos,
> and still reigned in Pelion's glades, that wild creature
> who had a mind friendly to men; as such a one he once reared
> the gentle craftsman of body-strengthening relief from pain, Asklepios,
> the hero and protector from diseases of all sorts.

Following the myth, he precedes two more conditions with a self-addressed warning to his soul (61–62):

> μή, φίλα ψυχά, βίον ἀθάνατον
> σπεῦδε, τὰν δ᾽ ἔμπρακτον ἄντλει μαχανάν.

Do not, my soul, strive for immortal life,
but exhaust the practical means at hand.

Then he reverts to the theme of the opening condition, but this time his use of an imperfect verb, ἔναι', in the protasis and an aorist, πίθον, in the apodosis, produces a mixed condition that is even less real (63–71):

εἰ δὲ σώφρων ἄντρον **ἔναι'** ἔτι Χίρων, καί τί οἱ
φίλτρον <ἐν> θυμῷ μελιγάρυες ὕμνοι
ἁμέτεροι **τίθεν**, ἰατῆρά τοί κέν νιν **πίθον**
καί νυν ἐσλοῖσι παρασχεῖν ἀνδράσιν θερμᾶν νόσων
ἤ τινα Λατοΐδα κεκλημένον ἢ πατέρος.
καί κεν ἐν ναυσὶν **μόλον** Ἰονίαν τάμνων θάλασσαν
Ἀρέθοισαν ἐπὶ κράναν παρ' Αἰτναῖον ξένον,

ὃς Συρακόσσαισι νέμει βασιλεὺς,
πραῢς ἀστοῖς, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοις δὲ θαυμαστὸς πατήρ.

Yet if wise Cheiron were still living in his cave, and if
my honey-sounding hymns could put a charm in his heart,
I would surely **have persuaded** him to provide a healer
now as well to cure the feverish illnesses of good men,
someone called a son of Apollo or of Zeus.
And **I would have come**, cleaving the Ionian Sea in a ship,
to the fountain of Arethusa and my Aitnaian host,

who rules as king over Syracuse,
gentle to townsmen, not begrudging to good men,
and to guests a wondrous father.

The content of the first protasis, "if wise Cheiron were still living . . .," repeats the opening unreal wish "that Cheiron . . . still lived." From present counterfactual a shift to past counterfactual occurs at line 65 with the aorist πίθον, " I would . . . have persuaded." The next condition, at 72–76, is purely a past counterfactual:

τῷ μὲν διδύμας χάριτας,
εἰ **κατέβαν** ὑγίειαν ἄγων χρυσέαν κῶμόν τ' ἀέθλων Πυθίων
αἴγλαν στεφάνοις,
τοὺς ἀριστεύων Φερένικος ἕλεν Κίρρᾳ ποτέ,

ἀστέρος οὐρανίου φαμὶ τηλαυγέστερον κείνῳ φάος
ἐξικόμαν κε βαθὺν πόντον περάσαις.

And **if I had landed**, bringing with me
two blessings, golden health and a victory revel
to add luster to the crowns from the Pythian games
which Pherenikos once won when victorious at Kirrha,
I would have come, I say, for that man
as a saving light outshining any heavenly star,
upon crossing the deep sea.

The apodosis—"if I had landed" (73 *ei . . . kateban*) builds on the second apodosis of the previous condition, "I would have come" (68 *ken . . . molon*). This dependency makes its actualization even more remote and unlikely: "I would have come as a saving light" (75–76 *phaos / exikoman ke*). The poet has built up a whole scenario on a series of hypotheticals; had he used the indicative, his speech would have been hyperbolic and hubristic!

Suddenly, in the very next line, the 'wish' does turn indicative, with *ethelô* of line 77 replacing *êthelon . . . ke* of line 1. Here the speaker expresses his (new) desire to pray "to the Mother, to whom, along with Pan, the maidens often sing before my door at night, / for she is a venerable goddess." His measured and proper prayer markedly differentiates him from Coronis and Asclepius, the egregious offenders in his narrative.

Within the pious frame that elevates the immortals and praises the blessings they offer, Pindar portrays the ephebic god as a cuckold susceptible to betrayal by a partner who is carrying his seed (8–23):

τὸν μὲν εὐίππου Φλεγύα θυγάτηρ
πρὶν τελέσσαι ματροπόλῳ σὺν Ἐλειθυίᾳ, δαμεῖσα χρυσέοις
τόξοισιν ὕπ᾽ Ἀρτέμιδος
εἰς Ἀΐδα δόμον ἐν θαλάμῳ κατέβα, τέχναις Ἀπόλλωνος. χόλος δ᾽
οὐκ ἀλίθιος
γίνεται παίδων Διός. ἁ δ᾽ ἀποφλαυρίξαισά νιν
ἀμπλακίαισι φρενῶν, ἄλλον αἴνησεν γάμον κρύβδαν πατρός,
πρόσθεν ἀκερσεκόμᾳ μιχθεῖσα Φοίβῳ,

καὶ φέροισα σπέρμα θεοῦ καθαρόν
οὐδ᾽ ἔμειν᾽ ἐλθεῖν τράπεζαν νυμφίαν,
οὐδὲ παμφώνων ἰαχὰν ὑμεναίων, ἅλικες
οἷα παρθένοι φιλέοισιν ἑταίρᾳ

ἑσπερίαις ὑποκουρίζεσθ᾽ ἀοιδαῖς· ἀλλά τοι
ἤρατο τῶν ἀπεόντων· οἷα καὶ πολλοὶ πάθον.
ἔστι δὲ φῦλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ματαιότατον,
ὅστις αἰσχύνων ἐπιχώρια παπταίνει τὰ πόρσω,
μεταμώνια θηρεύων ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν.

Before the daughter of the horseman Phlegyas
Could bring him to term with the help of Eleithuia, goddess of childbirth,
she was overcome
By the golden arrows of Artemis
In her chamber and went down to the house of Hades through Apollo's
designs. The anger of Zeus' children
Is no vain thing. Yet she made light of it.
In the folly of her mind and unknown to her father she consented to
another union,
Although she had previously lain with long-haired Phoebus

And was carrying the god's pure seed.
But she could not wait for the marriage feast to come
Or for the sound of full-voiced nuptial hymns with such
Endearments as unmarried companions are wont to utter
In evening songs. No, she was in love with things
Remote—such longings as many others have suffered,
For there is among mankind a very foolish kind of person,
Who scorns what is at hand and looks after things far away,
Chasing the impossible with hopes unfulfilled.

Apollo is duped on two levels. First, he is simply the cuckold whose manhood Coronis demeans when she enters the bed of Ischys, the Arcadian stranger. At the same time, the designation of the deceit as "lawless" (32 *athemin te dolon*) broadens the affront. The privative adjective evokes the god's realm of prophecy and his aversion to lies.[17] Coronis' deception thus violates all that

[17] Coronis' *athemis dolos* particularly offends a god whose domain is *themisteuein*, "to deliver prophecies" (*themistas*) and whose nurse in *H. Ap.* 94 is the Titan Themis, "Law." In this respect, Coronis resembles Telphusa, who deceived the mind of the god (*H. Ap.*, esp. 275–76, 376, 379).

Apollo stands for; and her swift punishment—by the arrows of Artemis at the devising (*technai*) of Apollo—is no private matter. It restores cosmic order.

The juxtaposition of Coronis' deception of Apollo with the poetic denial that anyone can deceive the god calls attention to the double divine/human register. So does Pindar's 'correction' of Hesiod's earlier version from the *Catalogue of Women*, in which a raven (*korax*) is the informer.[18] The poet underscores this correction by postponing the naming of his confidant, who is not the *korax* but his own all-knowing mind (*P*. 3.27–30):

> οὐδ᾽ ἔλαθε σκοπόν· ἐν δ᾽ ἄρα μηλοδόκῳ Πυθῶνι τόσσαις ἄιεν ναοῦ βασιλεύς
> Λοξίας, κοινᾶνι παρ᾽ εὐθυτάτῳ γνώμαν πιθών,
> πάντα ἰσάντι νόῳ· ψευδέων δ᾽ οὐχ ἅπτεται, κλέπτει τέ μιν,
> οὐ θεὸς οὐ βροτὸς ἔργοις οὔτε βουλαῖς.

> She did not elude the watching god, for although he was in flock-receiving Pytho as lord of his temple,
> Loxias perceived it, convinced by the surest confidant,
> his all-knowing mind.
> He does not grasp at falsehoods, and neither god
> nor mortal deceives him by deeds or designs.

The paradox of a maiden deceiving the god who knows all things in his mind evokes Hesiod's narrative of the tricks Prometheus played on Zeus, even though Zeus "knew the guile, and took note of it" (*Theog*. 551 . . . γνῶ ῥ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἠγνοίησε δόλον). Hesiod concludes his Prometheus tale in the *Theogony*, at line 615, with a maxim that summarizes his point: "there is no way to deceive or hide from the mind of Zeus."[19]

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[18] Cf. Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women* fr. 60 MW: "To whom, then, there came a messenger from the sacred feast to goodly Pytho, a crow (*korax*), and he told unshorn Phoebus of secret deeds (*erga aidêla*), that Ischys son of Elatus had wedded Coronis the daughter of Phlegyas of birth divine."

[19] In *WD* 47–48 Hesiod does acknowledge Prometheus' deceit of Zeus, who "was angered in his heart and hid the means of life / because Prometheus with his crooked schemes had cheated him" (ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε χολωσάμενος φρεσὶν ᾗσιν, / ὅττι μιν ἐξαπάτησε Προμηθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης). Later Zeus scolds Prometheus in similar terms: "you rejoice at tricking my wits and stealing the fire" (54–58 χαίρεις πῦρ κλέψας καὶ ἐμὰς φρένας / ἠπεροπεύσας).

In *P.* 3 Pindar sustains the notion of Apollo as a transcendent, cosmic god by a number of poetic strategies, including pointed silences. He glosses the fact that the god of prophecy could have predicted Coronis' treachery, emphasizing instead that the mind of the god knows everything and cannot be deceived and that Coronis cannot escape Apollo's watchfulness and her own doom. In addition, he protects the god from any charge of *hubris* or *atasthalia* by keeping the initial rape of Coronis on the periphery and never asking whether she willingly slept with the god or was coerced.[20] Like Cyrene in *P.* 9, Coronis never utters a word; her single role is to carry the seed of the god and she dies unwed, a *parthenos* (34), a *koura* (39). In fact, she incurs blame, as the crime and punishment story supplants the obliquely told rape narrative. Furthermore, as if to underscore the god's clemency, the poet has Apollo himself recount his decision to rescue his son from a most pitiful death in the womb of the dying Coronis (40–42): 'οὐκέτι / τλάσομαι ψυχᾷ γένος ἁμὸν ὀλέσσαι / οἰκτροτάτῳ θανάτῳ ματρὸς βαρείᾳ σὺν πάθᾳ.' ("No longer / shall I endure in my soul to destroy my own offspring / by a most pitiful death along with his mother's heavy suffering.")

Coronis' violent end, in a story of treachery and cuckoldry that quickly becomes a story of crime and punishment, implies that in fact she deserved her fate. Her transgressions, and her self-delusion, are generalized in several maxims that apply as well to Asclepius, whose resuscitation of a dead man betrays the medical training he acquired from Cheiron. These maxims, and the negative exempla of Coronis and Asclepius, apply to the emergent figure of the poetic *ego*, whose speech-behavior is the dramatic core of the ode. The speaker enacts just behavior and stands back from his own verbal near-transgression, despite the intensity of his ardent wish to revive the dead Cheiron. His counterfactuals give way to an indicative—*ethelô*—and affirm his proper relations to Apollo of the Pythian Games, as well as to Hieron of Syracuse. In knowing how to use his skills appropriately and ethically, he is neither an Asclepius nor a Coronis.

CONCLUSION

In each of these three epinicia, Apollo initiates a virgin into eros as a protagonist in a story: he woos and wins Cyrene, whom he transforms into the queen of a land; he impregnates Evadne and enables their son Iamos to find his calling; and, in the case of Coronis, first he conquers her, then becomes a victim of her deceit, and ultimately avenges her betrayal and delivers punishment, but he rescues their

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[20] Such ambiguity between divine seduction (*peithô*) and divine rape (*bia*) is a common feature of stories involving divine/human intercourse.

son, Asclepius. In each instance Apollo in story time behaves like an unenlightened male adolescent experiencing his first love but also on occasion as a compassionate father. The depiction of the god as both a seeking hero in a time-bound world and as a divinity and agent of change supplements other Pindaric techniques for elevating a human victor to the level of hero and for making each victor, as a result of his glorious achievement, seem not only heroic but godlike, indeed Apolline.[21]

Apollo's contradictions, which involve both self-mastery and domination of others, are central to the very genre of the victory ode and to the Pan-Hellenic Games held at Olympia, Delphi, Nemea, and the Isthmus. Apollo speaks to all young men (and indeed to men of all ages) aspiring to express their manhood through a victory in the games by simultaneously dominating others and exercising self-control. Those who succeed will approach divine (or at least heroic) transcendence with the help of Apollo himself (*Apollônos ge hekêti*). Pindar's *epinikia* seem to address the question, "What do (young) men want?" and to unlock the secrets of male fantasy and desire. His three representations of Apollo as first lover—of Cyrene, Coronis, and Evadne, who each bear his child—reflect the male fantasy of being the one who makes a particular virgin blossom into womanhood through the sexual act. The important part of the male fantasy is reflected in Apollo's power to make this transformation take place. Insofar as the victor, whatever his actual age, is analogous to Apollo, his victory, the offspring, so to speak, of his transcendent youth or reinvigorated manhood, fulfills such a fantasy.

I end on a note of speculation about why epinician Apollo is relevant to every victorious athlete, no matter what his age-grade. Every male once came of age. At the moment of triumph, he relives and re-experiences the crossing of that dangerous threshold between youth and adulthood and affirms his manhood through victory, *Apollônos ge hekêti*. Even the elderly and sickly Hieron of *P*. 3

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[21] On ways in which the poet and the victor partake of heroic values see Fränkel 472–74.

can experience such a renewal, such a resuscitation of vigor, with Pindar as the agent of transformation, a second Asclepius.

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